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1.  INTRODUCTION  
Supply of products and components starts early before the construction and commissioning of 
a Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) and subsequently continues during plant operation and outages 
until decommissioning. Effectively functioning and properly managed nuclear supply chain can 
in a large extent guarantee adequate quality of supplied products, contributing to safe and 
reliable operation of nuclear installations. However, safety related incidents and events due to 
substandard components continue to occur; number of such reported incidents is not 
decreasing, and there are some potential for its growth. Consequently, lessons learned from 
the large operational experience as well as from current trends in the global nuclear supply 
chain are very important for utilities and regulators.  
During the last decades the nuclear supply chain experienced a number of serious changes. 
New specific features recently became usual such as shortage of skilled design, deficit of 
manufacturing and engineering capacity in the market, alterations in the manufacturing 
environment, including the rising costs of manufacturing, the shrinking resources of 
manufacturing bases, shortened product life cycles, emerging new materials, technological 
processes and standards, and the globalization of market economies. State-of-the-art nuclear 
supply chain is an integrated process wherein a number of various business entities (i.e., 
suppliers, designers, manufacturers, distributors, and retailers) work together with the end 
users - NPPs. Analysis of this complicated system as a whole and highlighting of its 
deficiencies could help to reduce the frequency of occurrences when substandard components 
are delivered to NPPs and causing safety related incidents.  
Attempts aiming to use operational experience in the area related with supply of components 
have already been made in the past. However, majority of these works are covering only some 
particular issues related with supply of components and not covering the entire nuclear supply 
chain as a whole. In order to identify the main recurring causes, contributing factors and lessons 
learned, and to disseminate and promote recommendations to reduce the recurrence of similar 
events in the future it was decided to conduct an up-to-date analysis of events related to supply 
of components to NPPs.  
This summary report represents results of study [1] performed by the centralized office of the 
European Clearinghouse on Operating Experience Feedback (OEF). It covers events at NPPs 
caused directly or partially by inadequate spare parts, products or components supplied by 
suppliers/vendors during the operation of NPPs. The general purpose of this work is the further 
improvement of safety provisions by means of identifying and eliminating circumstances, 
precursors and causes of said events, as well as highlighting the most important lessons 
learned and developing recommendations. 
2. METHODOLOGY  
This study has been performed by means of extracting, systematising and analysing adequate 
operational experience-related information from event reports stored in the IRS (OECD 
NEA/IAEA), NRC (US), IRSN (France) and GRS (Germany) databases during period 1980-
2010.  
The process of identification, retrieving and screening of relevant events consists of several 
steps (see Figure 1). Aiming to limit the number of potentially relevant event reports and to 
avoid overlapping with analogous studies already performed, only events at NPPs which were 
directly or partially caused by inadequate spare parts, products or components supplied by 
suppliers/vendors during the period of operation were selected. Events during construction and 
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commissioning of initial set of equipment before start of operation of NPP (analyzed in [2]) or 
caused by deficiencies in maintenance, modifications or services on site provided by 
subcontractors were considered as not relevant for this study, if they are not directly related to 
the supply of components. The final list of events used for analysis contained 222 IRS incident 
reports, 709 reports from the US NRC data base (section corresponding to 10CFR part 21), 
197 IRSN reports and 93 GRS reports. 
IRS data base
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Figure 1. Algorithm of screening and retrieving of IRS event reports 
 
In a second stage, the selected events reports were classified into the selected families, 
subfamilies, groups and subgroups and analyzed in depth striving to examine the direct 
causes, contributing causes and root causes, safety significance of the events, main significant 
corrective actions and lessons learned. In order to understand better the mechanisms for how 
and why substandard components originate and how they become installed into the structures 
and systems of NPPs, causing undesirable incidents or events, two different classification 
systems were used during the analysis. The first classification system consisted of seven 
event subfamilies corresponding to all separate stages of the supply chain (including design, 
manufacture, transportation, storage and distribution) and the licensee’s main lines of defence 
designed to prevent the installation of substandard components. The second classification 
system was established following the goal to determine the types of most frequently failing 
components and was based on the four main groups with relatively different physical working 
principles: mechanical (including hydraulic/pneumatic), electrical, instrumentation/control and 
fuel. 
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3. MAIN FINDINGS 
 
The most contributing processes of the nuclear supply chain to the supply of inappropriate 
components are (see Figure 2): component design (42%), manufacturing (32%), and 
inadequate technical documentation provided by supplier (9.4%).  
Manufacturing
32%
Design
42%
Counterfeit
1.8%
Acceptance 
control
8.7%Suppliers' control1.4%
Technical 
specifications
3.3%
Technical 
documentation
9.4%
Transportation
1.1%
 
Figure 2. Distribution of events from the IRS data base related to the supply of components in 
regard to the different stages of production and supply chain 
 
Comparing rate of failures of components with relatively different physical working principles, 
the groups of mechanical (including hydraulic/pneumatic) and electrical components are 
obviously the most prevalent (see Fig. 3 to 5). Among mechanical components, valves 
(including safety/relief/check/solenoid valves, pressure switches, valve operators, controllers, 
dampers and fire breakers, seals and packing) are quite clearly the most frequently failing – 
they are causing up to 64 % reported events. Among electrical elements, three subgroups can 
be distinguished by the frequency of faults: a) circuit breakers, power breakers, fuses; b) 
relays, connectors, hand switches, push buttons, contacts; c) wiring (including logic circuitry, 
controllers, starters, electrical cables, printed boards/cards, governors). 
 
The identified causes in the most populated subfamily of events related to design are mainly of 
technical nature. The design errors most frequently referred to in the event reports of this 
subfamily are: inadequate selection of material and/or heat treatment, inappropriate 
construction, systemic errors in calculations and low reliability/insufficient longevity (see Fig. 
6). 
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Figure 3. Distribution of events related to the supply of components in regard to specific groups 
of components failed 
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Figure 4. Distribution of failed components which caused events related with design 
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Figure 5. Distribution of failed components which caused events related to manufacturing 
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Figure 6. Most frequent design errors identified after events related with design 
 
Defects of technical nature also are the most commonly mentioned as causes of events 
related to manufacturing. Generally they are related to inadequate material used and/or heat 
treatment applied, inadequate or not followed technological procedures, inappropriate 
assembling, wrong dimensions, and welding defects (see Fig. 7). Only in a few cases human 
factors, organizational or management problems are mentioned as complementary causes. 
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Figure 7. Most frequent deficiencies identified after events related with manufacturing 
 
It is worth to stress that real root causes of events seem to be not properly identified in a 
considerable part of the analyzed event reports, especially when they are related with 
processes managed by suppliers (design, manufacturing). For example, most popular findings 
such as “design weaknesses” or “manufacturing deficiencies” actually are not root causes of 
events. Real root causes of such events are hidden deficiencies in the management systems 
or low quality/safety culture of adequate design or manufacturing organization and are 
probably remaining latent. These organizational weaknesses later materialise in design or 
manufacturing errors or failures to detect products of inadequate quality in a due time. 
Unidentified root causes of events lead up to putting in place ineffective corrective actions and 
prevent learning from operational experience, creating wrong belief that problem is solved 
while high probability for recurrence of analogous events still remains. 
 
The safety significance of events caused by substandard components is relatively high. Up to 
50% of events of different subfamilies resulted in some real undesirable consequences: 
unplanned reactor shutdown, unanticipated release of radioactive materials, damage of fuel 
etc. The remaining part of the analyzed events had no real identified consequences or no 
effect on operation of a plant; however, most of these events had potential to cause real more 
serious consequences under other circumstances due to loss, degradation or weakening of 
safety functions or potential unavailability or inoperability of safety related systems or 
equipment.  
Prevailing corrective actions which are usually put in place or planned following the majority of 
events are of reactive nature: most of them are targeted to replacing, repairing or recovering of 
failed component or system and restoring its functionality, i.e. to eliminate direct causes of the 
incident or troubleshooting. However, they do not seem sufficient to remove latent root causes 
of incidents and are often ineffective to prevent their recurrence. 
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4. RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Scrutinizing the lessons learned from the analyzed events and looking beyond the component-
specific or condition-specific issues it is possible to formulate some generically applicable 
recommendations for preventing or decreasing the probability of supply to NPPs of 
inappropriate products and components. 
 
4.1. General recommendations  
 
These recommendations could be addressed both to vendors/suppliers (including designers, 
manufacturers, distributors), licensees and regulators: 
1.1. Besides formal putting in place of state-of-the-art quality management systems, their 
practical implementation and maintaining operational, effectiveness and continuous 
improvement should be ensured in all organizations participating in nuclear supply 
chain. 
1.2. Maintaining strong safety (quality) culture at all organizational levels: quality and 
safety should be the highest priority prevailing over costs and schedule. 
1.3. In order to detect deviations in components’ quality with higher sensitivity, it is worth 
organizing the several examination/inspection sessions of components’ quality and 
quality management systems, carried out by designers and manufacturers itself, by 
vendor/supplier, independent 3rd party, licensee and regulator.  
1.4. Regulatory bodies must effectively communicate the current regulations to vendors 
supplying nuclear components and services, so that they are well informed about 
their obligations. Regulations should include obligations for vendors, designers and 
manufacturers to report defects identified or otherwise fully assure that safety-related 
components will perform adequately in service.  
1.5. Regulators should conduct routine as well as proactive inspections of domestic and 
foreign vendors' supplying safety-related parts and services to nuclear power plants 
according to approved vendor’s inspection program. In order to detect substandard 
components timely, frequency and scope of inspections should be increased. 
Vendor’s status of implementation and current level of compliance with relevant 
quality assurance regulations and other requirements should be checked during 
these inspections.  
1.6. Aiming to facilitate regulatory oversight of suppliers (especially located in foreign 
countries), international cooperation between national regulatory bodies should be 
expanded and adequately coordinated. 
1.7. Regulatory approach to counterfeit, fraudulent, and misrepresented items (CI) should 
be strengthened. In the context of increasing occurrence of CI in nuclear and other 
industries the currently existing reactive approach should be enhanced by introducing 
in suppliers’ inspection program the formal strategy and plan to monitor and evaluate 
potential CI.  
1.8. In order to address the counterfeiting issue in a proactive manner, a specific 
international data base (DB) for gathering and sharing information about incidents 
related to substandard components should be developed and maintained. This data 
base should contain the adequate information about suppliers and their products. All 
participating organizations should provide relevant data to this DB about substandard 
components, products, services detected before or after installation or use at the 
plant. 
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1.9. A modification to the existing event reporting criteria should be considered. The legal 
system of each country should contain requirements for all entities acting in the 
nuclear supply chain (including suppliers/vendors, designers, manufacturers and 
distributors) to inform national regulatory body and/or some international or regional 
responsible organization and the end user (NPPs) about any defects or non-
compliances discovered in the components supplied to nuclear facilities. 
1.10. Quality, comprehensiveness and thoroughness of the event investigations should be 
improved. Specifically, root causes of events should be correctly identified, especially 
for events caused by inadequate activities of vendors/suppliers, designers, 
manufacturers, distributors. 
 
4.2. Recommendations for vendors/suppliers, designers, manufacturers, 
distributors 
 
2.1. For ensuring good management of the subcontracting chains, it is important that in 
each call for tender on sub-contracts the vendor clearly indicates and emphasizes the 
nuclear specific practices and requirements. These could include: 
• a requirement to provide design documentation in an early stage for getting 
manufacturing approval from the licensee and regulatory body, 
• a requirement on multiple quality controls and regulatory inspections, to be 
conducted during and after manufacturing, and 
• expectations on safety culture. 
2.2. Improvement of design quality seems to be the most effective mean for preventing or 
decreasing probability of supply to NPPs of inappropriate products and components. A 
special attention should be given to the quality of the design of nuclear power plant 
components important for safety, especially for valves, seals, circuit breakers, relays. 
2.3. Apart from mandatory enforcement to meet all applicable design requirements, 
standards, codes and specifications (including procurement requirements), every 
efforts should be applied to avoid the most frequently noticed design errors (creating 
inappropriate constructions, selection of inadequate materials etc). 
2.4. Design assumptions and calculation methods should be consistently considered and 
updated (if applicable), taking into account operational experience feedback, lessons 
learned and results of studies and research programs performed considering specific 
design related phenomena, especially concerning design of most problematic 
components such as valves.  
2.5. Improvements in quality management of manufacturing seem to be an important 
instrument for preventing or decreasing probability of supply inappropriate products and 
components to NPPs. The common most frequently noticed manufacturing errors such 
as deviations from technological procedures, use of inadequate materials, inappropriate 
assembling should be avoided. A special attention should be given to quality of 
manufacturing of components important for safety, especially valves, seals, circuit 
breakers, relays. 
2.6. The supplier’s documentation for delivered components should contain the detailed 
latest available information on the important parameters and characteristics. It should 
be checked and compared against the relevant information in originally supplied 
documentation or assumed in the original design, especially during replacement of 
obsolescent components by new ones during modifications or refurbishment.  
2.7. Any deviation from procurement requirements, change of design specifications or any 
characteristics/parameters defined by design that were introduced by other participants 
in the supply chain (e.g., by manufacturer) should be carefully considered in advance, 
 12 
harmonized with the designer and the licensee, appropriately documented and 
approved. 
 
3. Recommendations for licensees 
  
3.1. A verification of vendor’s and sub-contractors’ real competencies and capabilities 
should be made before making purchase. The licensee needs to have means to 
ascertain that the issues specific to nuclear safety and quality management are 
adequately addressed, and the respective controls are properly agreed in each contract 
between the vendor and its sub-contractors. The actual competence of manufacturers 
and sub-contractors is not easy to judge through auditing only. Capabilities need to be 
assessed not only in case of sub-contractors that are newcomers to the nuclear field. 
Besides the records about earlier experience the current capabilities of manufacturer 
should be verified, including its actual control on quality management at the shop floor 
level. 
3.2. A licensee’s capability to identify products or components susceptible to be 
substandard can be improved by: 
• wider involvement of engineering staff having an adequate qualification and 
experience in the procurement and product acceptance process;  
• establishment of well organized, adequately equipped, properly managed and 
effective source inspection, procurement, receipt inspection, and testing 
programs. 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
The results gained during this study once more validated the possibility to extract useful 
information from operational experience. They revealed that considering of a nuclear supply 
chain as whole combined with continuous analysis of events related with supply of 
components provides important insights for further improvement of safety.  
Findings of this study highlighted that nuclear supply chain’s management system is not 
effective enough to prevent the increasing proliferation of substandard (especially counterfeit) 
components to the safety related systems of NPPs. Overwhelming majority of the supply-
related events seems to be caused by the same group of common fundamental reasons – 
inadequate quality/safety culture and deficiencies or ineffectiveness of management systems, 
quality management or quality assurance either of supplier/vendor - designer, manufacturer 
etc. - or of customer (NPPs). Consequently, the main opportunity for preventing or decreasing 
the probability of events caused by inappropriate supplied components lies in the improvement 
of management systems, including management of nuclear supply chain and management of 
NPPs. 
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6. LIST OF ACRONYMS 
 
CFR  Code of federal regulations (US) 
CI   Counterfeit, fraudulent, and misrepresented items 
DB  Data base 
GRS Gesellschaft für Anlagen und Reaktorsicherheit mbH, Germany 
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency 
IRS Incident Reporting System 
IRSN Institut de Radioprotection et de Sûreté Nucléaire, France 
NPP Nuclear Power Plant 
NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission (US) 
OECD NEA Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Nuclear Energy 
Agency 
OEF  Operational experience feedback 
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ABSTRACT 
This report presents the essential results of study performed by European Clearinghouse on Operational 
Experience Feedback in cooperation with IRSN and GRS aiming to analyze the impact of inappropriate 
components supplied to NPPs on safety. Study has been performed by means of extracting, systematizing and 
analyzing of adequate operational experience related information from event reports stored in the relevant data 
bases. Methodology of study includes identifying, highlighting and examining of circumstances, precursors, 
causes and safety significance of said events, as well as of most important corrective actions, lessons learned 
and recommendations. Trying to evaluate impact of different potential sources causing incidents the entire 
nuclear supply chain as a whole is covered, and all stages of this system including design, manufacturing, 
storage, transportation are taken into account in the developed system of 7 subfamilies. The main defence lines 
of the licensee designed to prevent penetration of substandard components such as thorough preparation of the 
procurement documentation, source inspection prior to authorizing release for delivery and inspection/testing of 
items on receipt are considered as well.  
Based on the results of performed analysis major contributors to the existing problem were identified. Among the 
analyzed subfamilies deficiencies in design cause about 42% of selected events and manufacturing faults cause 
32%. The most frequently failing are mechanical (including hydraulic/ pneumatic) components (40 - 55% of 
relevant events) and electrical elements – they take 30 - 37% of total events number respectively. The worst 
vulnerable specific types of components are also identified: they are valves and seals among mechanical 
components, circuit breakers and relays among electrical components. Scrutinizing the lessons learned from the 
analyzed events and looking beyond the component-specific or condition-specific ones some generically 
applicable recommendations for preventing or decreasing the probability of supply to NPPs of inappropriate 
products and components are formulated. 
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